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ABSTRACT: We study ￿rm heterogeneity in a speci￿c factors model to address the e⁄ect of factor
mobility on reallocation gains from trade. A model is proposed with Melitz type ￿rm heterogeneity with
two sectors, two countries and two ￿xed factors and one factor mobile across sectors. Equilibrium in
each sector can be concisely represented by a demand and supply equation and a FE and ZCP condition.
Varying the substitution elasticity between the ￿xed and mobile factor we show that the welfare gains
from trade liberalization are larger in countries with a lower substitution elasticity. Furthermore, it is
shown that the immobile production factor in the comparative disadvantage sector can still gain from
trade liberalization due to the reallocation e⁄ect.
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mobility on reallocation gains from trade. A model is proposed with Melitz type ￿rm heterogeneity with
two sectors, two countries and two ￿xed factors and one factor mobile across sectors. Equilibrium in
each sector can be concisely represented by a demand and supply equation and a FE and ZCP condition.
Varying the substitution elasticity between the ￿xed and mobile factor we show that the welfare gains
from trade liberalization are larger in countries with a lower substitution elasticity. Furthermore, it is
shown that the immobile production factor in the comparative disadvantage sector can still gain from
trade liberalization due to the reallocation e⁄ect.
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1 Introduction
Welfare gains from trade in models with heterogeneous ￿rms are driven by a reallocation of resources
from less productive to more productive ￿rms additional to sectoral specialization (Melitz, 2003; Bernard,
et al., 2003; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008; Bernard, et al., 2007, among others). In this paper we address
the impact of factor mobility across sectors on the reallocation gains from trade by incorporating Melitz
type ￿rm heterogeneity into the traditional speci￿c factors model. In a one sector setting basic intuition
suggests that higher factor mobility increases pro￿tability of entry inducing larger reallocation e⁄ects.
We show that in a multisector setting this basic intuition does not hold, as within-sector reallocations
interact with between-sector reallocations.
We work with a speci￿c factors model in a setting with two countries and two sectors and factor
immobility across countries. There are three production factors: labor is mobile across sectors and the
two types of capital are sector speci￿c. We ￿rst start with a model using a Cobb-Douglas production
function of input bundles in each sector. This implies that the elasticity of transformation between the
two sectors is a function of the Cobb-Douglas parameter on the mobile production factor. Varying the
Cobb-Douglas parameter to mimic for variation in factor mobility also picks up factor biased technical
change. In this case the gains from liberalization become a function of the size of the di⁄erent production
factors.
1We then generalize the speci￿cation to a CES production function of input bundles and vary the
substitution elasticity between production factors. This exercise shows that the welfare gains from trade
liberalization are smaller when the substitution elasticity is larger as a larger substitution elasticity implies
less specialization across countries. Less labor is allocated to the comparative advantage sector, as there
is less pressure to have equal factor proportions in production. With less specialization the gains from
trade liberalization are smaller. We observe that intersectoral reallocation is the determining factor in
this model, instead of intrasectoral reallocation as in one sector ￿rm heterogeneity models. The policy
implication is that in countries with more rigid factor markets, specialization is larger and the gains from
trade liberalization are larger.
In the simulations we also show that the scarce production factor can still gain from trade liberalization
under ￿rm heterogeneity due to lower prices. This result is related to the result found by Bernard, et
al. (2007) that in a Heckscher-Ohlin model the relatively scarce production factor might still gain from
trade liberalization, a generalized Stolper Samuelson theorem. Similarly, our result implies that the
- traditional - political economy implications of the speci￿c factors model should be interpreted with
caution, as it is very well possible that none of the production factors loses with trade liberalization.
The real loss might be incurred not by production factors (and capital owners), but by ￿rm owners,
with sunk investments in speci￿c varieties. Bombardini (2008) focuses on the gains and losses of ￿rm
owners with trade liberalization, showing that in more concentrated industries there is more lobbying
for protection, as larger ￿rms can coordinate their lobbying e⁄orts more easily. Another result related
to what Bernard, et al. (2007) ￿nd in the Heckscher-Ohlin setting is that the selection e⁄ect of trade
liberalization is larger in comparative advantage sectors. Moving from autarky to costly trade the cuto⁄
productivity goes up quicker and the exporting cuto⁄ productivity is closer to the domestic cuto⁄ in the
comparative advantage sector.
A methodological contribution of the paper is to show how in multisectoral models equilibrium in
each sector can be represented by four equations, a demand and supply equation and a free entry (FE)
and zero cuto⁄ pro￿t (ZCP) condition.
The literature on the speci￿c factors model starts with contributions by Viner (1931), Haberler
(1950) (other contributions include Jones (1971) and Neary (1978)). On the interaction between the
gains from trade and factor mobility, Artuc, et al. (2010) estimate in a structural model switching costs
of workers between sectors. They show that from a lifetime perspective all factors gain from trade shocks,
i.e. also the scarce factor, as the ￿ ows between sectors are large. Using a di⁄erent model we arrive at the
same ￿nding. Balistreri, et al. (2009) show in a model with endogenous labor supply that a larger factor
2supply elasticity (of labor) leads to a bigger increase in the welfare gains from trade. Still, this model
is not suitable to examine the e⁄ect of factor mobility on the (reallocation) welfare gains from trade,1
because the larger welfare gains with a larger labor supply elasticity are driven to a large extent by the
fact that welfare can simply increase more when consumption and leisure are more substitutable.
2 Model
We model a two sector, two country and two factors of production model with Melitz (2003) ￿rm het-
erogeneity in both sectors. Upper nest utility and the production of input bundles are both CES.2 With
this general setup we nest two models. First, when both factors of production are fully mobile between
sectors, we end up with a Heckscher-Ohlin model with ￿rm heterogeneity like in Bernard, et al. (2007).
The di⁄erence is that upper nest utility and the production of input bundles in our model are CES
instead of Cobb-Douglas. Second, with labor being fully mobile and capital fully immobile, we get a
speci￿c factors model like in Jones (1971) and Neary (1978). In the special case that the production
of input bundles in this model is Cobb-Douglas and the Cobb-Douglas parameters are equal in the two
sectors, the elasticity of transformation between input bundles in the two sectors is a monotone (positive)
function of the ￿ exible factor (labor) Cobb-Douglas parameter. Before discussing this in detail, we show
in general how equilibrium conditions in each sector can be expressed with four equations: a demand and
supply curve and a free entry and zero cuto⁄ pro￿t condition.
2.1 Demand
There are two countries indexed by subscripts i = H;F. There are two composite goods, X1 and X2. All













1The authors do not claim this, but want to make a di⁄erent point with their simulations, i.e. that in multisector
simulations one cannot summarize the welfare gains from trade by single statistic measuring the trade openness of a
country as Arkolakis, et al. (2008) claim in single sector models.
2The upper nest utility could be further generalized to allow for example for non-homothetic preferences.






















































There is a mass of producers of varieties in each sector di⁄ering in productivity ’. Firms face an iceberg
trade cost ￿ijm for exports from i to j in sector m and a ￿xed export cost fijm for producing in country
i and selling in country j. Assuming fijm￿
￿m￿1
ijm > fiim > 0, only a subset of domestic producing ￿rms
can export. We assume ￿iim = 1. Firms in sector m use homogeneous bundles Zim as inputs with price
pZim. The cost function of a ￿rm producing in country i and selling an amount xijm in country j having








Each ￿rm produces a unique variety, so we can identify demand for variety ! by the productivity of
the ￿rm producing this variety. Demand xijm (’) and revenue rijm (’) of a ￿rm with productivity ’
3Alternatively, we can interpret X1 and X2 as composite goods produced by CRS ￿nal goods producers using a continuum
of intermediates xim (!).



















Maximizing pro￿ts using (6) and (8) generates the following markup pricing rule of a ￿rm with produc-







Entry and exit are like in Melitz (2003), i.e. potential ￿rms can draw a productivity parameter ’
from a distribution F (’) after paying a sunk entry cost fepZim. Hence we assume that the same input
bundles are used for development of new varieties as for production. Entering ￿rms either decide to start
producing for one or two markets or leave the market immediately. Firms face a ￿xed death probability
￿ each period. A cuto⁄ productivity parameter ’￿
ijm for production in country i and sales in country
j can be de￿ned. Firms drawing a ’ ￿ ’￿
iim enter the market in country i and all other ￿rms leave
immediately.
2.3 Sectoral Equilibrium
We can characterize equilibrium in sector m by a supply equation (its dual representation given by the
de￿nition of the price index), a demand equation, a free entry condition (FE) and a relation between the
domestic and exporting zero cuto⁄ pro￿t condition (ZCP). We start with the price index, which consists










With Nijm the mass of ￿rms producing in i and selling in j. e ’ijm is a measure for average productivity





















5Demand can be expressed as total spending on sector m goods produced in country i, hence goods




















Revenue Rim in country i in sector m is equal to total cost:4
Rim = PZimZim (13)
The ZCP dictates that a ￿rm with cuto⁄ productivity ’￿





















































For further discussion we introduce a Pareto distribution of productivities. The distribution of initial
productivities from which entering ￿rms draw is de￿ned as follows:





with ￿im the shape parameter and ￿im the size parameter in this case. The FE and expressions for

















4This can be shown using the steady state entry/exit conditions together with the free entry condition, implying that

























































. Equilibrium in sector m is now de￿ned by equations for demand
(18), supply (19), the free entry condition (17) and the relation between domestic and exporting ZCP
(15).5 These are functions of the endogenous variables the amount of input bundles, Zim, the price index
of outputs, Pim, the price of inputs PZim, the domestic and exporting cuto⁄s ’￿
iim and ’￿
ijm and income
Ii and the price index PUi.
2.4 Supply of Input Bundles
To close the model, we have to specify expressions for the supply of input bundles Zim and income Ii.
There are two factors of production, labor Lim and capital Kim. Input bundles are a CES function of












with 0 < ￿Lim;￿Kim < 1; ￿ > 0 (20)
























Ki and Li are the amount of capital and labor available and ri and wi are the rental rate and wage. The















In the speci￿c factors model, labor is mobile across sectors and capital is immobile. The factor market
equilibrium condition for labor is given by equation (22). The equilibrium condition for m sector speci￿c
5The domestic ZCP is substituted into the FE, therefore we do not have to include it and inclusion of the ratio of ZCPs
is su¢ cient.







2.5 Closing the Model
To de￿ne equilibrium, an expression is needed for total income. Total income in country i is equal to
payments of factor bundles:
Ii = pZi1Zi1 + pZi2Zi2 (25)
Equilibrium is de￿ned by supply, demand, the FE and the ZCP ratio and the de￿nition of the price of
input bundles for each country i and each sector m, respectively, equations (18), (19), (17), (15) and
(23), the price index and total income for each country i, respectively equations (5) and (25). For the
Bernard, et al. (2007) model we add the factor market equilibrium equations (21), (22) for each country
i. For the speci￿c factors model we add the following factor market equilibrium equations: (22) for each
country i and (24) for each country i and each sector m.
As a special case, in the speci￿c factors model we can express the elasticity of transformation between
input bundles in the two sectors as a function of the parameters of the model only. If we set the
substitution elasticity ￿ in the production function of input bundles at 1 (more exactly ￿ ! 1) and
equalize the Cobb-Douglas parameters ￿im for labor and capital in the two sectors, then we get the







i2 ; ￿i1 = K
￿i￿1
￿i




Equation (26) can be derived as follows. The production function of input bundles with substitution





im 0 < ￿i < 1 (27)





i2 , gives equation (26).The elasticity of transformation between Xi1
and Xi2 is equal to !i =
￿i
1￿￿i and is thus rising in the Cobb-Douglas parameter ￿i of the mobile factor
of production, labor. To close the model, we add that the marginal rate of transformation between Zi1













The speci￿c factors model with Cobb-Douglas production of input bundles solves with demand, supply,
FE and ZCP, respectively equations (18), (19), (17), (15), for each country i and each sector m and the
price index, total income, the transformation curve and optimality along the transformation curve for
each country i, respectively equations (5), (25), (26) and (28).
3 Analysis
Using the model of the previous section, we address various questions on the e⁄ect of factor mobility
on the reallocation gains from trade. Because of the size and complexity of the model we cannot derive
analytical results. Therefore, we use simulations.6 The parameters used for the simulations are discussed
and motivated in Appendix B.
3.1 Factor Mobility with Cobb-Douglas Production Function of Input Bun-
dles
Let us start with the special case discussed above, production is Cobb-Douglas and there is mobile labor
and immobile capital, to determine the e⁄ect of factor mobility on the reallocation gains from trade. As
pointed out above, the elasticity of transformation between di⁄erent goods, !i, in this case becomes an
explicit function of the Cobb-Douglas parameter ￿i of the mobile production factor. Thus, there is an
explicit expression for the transformation curve between production in the two sectors.
To address the e⁄ect of factor mobility on trade related reallocation e⁄ects, trade costs are reduced
for various values of the transformation elasticity !, i.e. the Cobb-Douglas parameter ￿ on the mobile
production factor. Before turning to the di⁄erential impact on (immobile) capital and (mobile) labor, we
use as welfare measure simply real total income, i.e. nominal total income divided by the price index.7
Table 1 shows the results for welfare de￿ned as nominal total income divided by the price index and
for the domestic cuto⁄ parameter, both in country 1. The sum of sector-speci￿c capital is equal to the
6We use GAMS to run the simulations. The code of the di⁄erent simulation exercises is available upon request.
7This welfare measure re￿ects utility of any agent in our model, assuming that all agents get equal rewards from labor
and the two types of capital. Alternatively, it is a measure for social welfare with the di⁄erent factor owners getting equal
weight in the social welfare function.
9amount of labor and the two countries have equal endowments, i.e. L11 = L21 = 3, K11 = K21 = 1,
K12 = K22 = 2. The other parameters are as discussed in Appendix B. Though we start from a
symmetric equilibrium there is still trade due to ￿rm heterogeneity and CES preferences. The simulation
performed is a variation in trade costs for various values of the elasticity of transformation. With this
assumption the cuto⁄ productivities do not vary with the elasticity of transformation (’￿
11 is displayed
in Table 1, the other results are available upon request).
Therefore, we undertake two other simulations, where the amount of labor is larger respectively
smaller than the sum of sector speci￿c capital. The results are shown in Tables 2 and 3. In the former
we speci￿cally assume that L1 = 5, L2 = 3, K11 = K21 = K12 = K22 = 1, whereas in the latter the
endowment structures is L1 = 1, L2 = 2, K11 = K12 = 2, K21 = K22 = 3. The other parameters are as
discussed in Appendix B. In Tables 2 and 3 the cuto⁄values do vary with the elasticity of transformation.
Table 1 Cobb-Douglas model with balanced endowments
￿ = 0:2 ￿ = 0:3 ￿ = 0:4 ￿ = 0:5 ￿ = 0:6 ￿ = 0:7
Welfare W = I1=PU1
￿ = 1:0 2.254 2.257 2.260 2.264 2.268 2.274
￿ = 1:2 2.082 2.085 2.087 2.091 2.095 2.101
￿ = 1:4 1.981 1.983 1.986 1.989 1.993 1.998
￿ = 1:6 1.918 1.920 1.923 1.926 1.930 1.935




￿ = 1:0 1.279 1.279 1.279 1.279 1.279 1.279
￿ = 1:2 1.181 1.181 1.181 1.181 1.181 1.181
￿ = 1:4 1.123 1.123 1.123 1.123 1.123 1.123
￿ = 1:6 1.088 1.088 1.088 1.088 1.088 1.088
￿ = 1:8 1.065 1.065 1.065 1.065 1.065 1.065
When there is more labor than capital as in Table 2, the cuto⁄productivity goes down as the elasticity of
transformation rises. This is contrary to what was expected interpreting ￿ as a measure for the elasticity
of transformation, as more factor mobility should make the reallocation e⁄ect larger and thus the cuto⁄
productivity larger. The reason is that a a higher parameter ￿ implies that the abundant and thus
cheaper production factor, labor, becomes more important in production. Therefore, input costs become
cheaper, it is easier to survive and the cuto⁄ productivity will go down. When there is more capital than
labor as in Table 3, the reallocation e⁄ect is as expected: the cuto⁄ productivity rises.
Welfare rises with an increase in the labor Cobb-Douglas parameter (higher elasticity of transforma-
tion) when there is more labor than capital and welfare declines when there is more capital than labor.
10An increase in the Cobb-Douglas parameter of labor leads to a higher productivity in the production of
input bundles when a country has more labor and decreases the productivity when the country has more
capital. Changes in the Cobb-Douglas parameters re￿ ect not only a change in the elasticity of transfor-
mation between sectors, but also factor biased technical change. Welfare will go up with an increase in
the labor Cobb-Douglas parameter if a country has more labor than capital. Therefore, the sector speci￿c
model with Cobb-Douglas production of input bundles and Cobb-Douglas parameters that can be easily
interpreted as a proxy for the elasticity of transformation is not an accurate model to evaluate the impact
of more factor mobility on the reallocation gains from trade. We will evaluate this question again in a
model with CES production functions of input bundles, varying the elasticity of substitution between the
factors of production. Before, we however turn to the question whether the reallocation gains from trade
can dominate the welfare losses of the scarce factors of production in the speci￿c factors model.
Table 2 Cobb-Douglas model with labor biased endowments
￿ = 0:2 ￿ = 0:3 ￿ = 0:4 ￿ = 0:5 ￿ = 0:6 ￿ = 0:7
Welfare W = I1=PU1
￿ = 1:0 1.677 1.884 2.116 2.377 2.671 3.002
￿ = 1:2 1.559 1.757 1.979 2.230 2.513 2.833
￿ = 1:4 1.489 1.680 1.896 2.141 2.416 2.728
￿ = 1:6 1.445 1.632 1.844 2.084 2.355 2.661




￿ = 1:0 1.256 1.246 1.236 1.226 1.217 1.208
￿ = 1:2 1.168 1.162 1.156 1.150 1.145 1.140
￿ = 1:4 1.115 1.112 1.108 1.104 1.101 1.097
￿ = 1:6 1.082 1.080 1.077 1.075 1.073 1.070
￿ = 1:8 1.061 1.059 1.057 1.056 1.054 1.052
3.2 Reallocation Gains for the Scarce Production Factors and Across Sectors
In the speci￿c factors model with perfect competition in product and factor markets, trade liberalization
has a negative e⁄ect on the real remuneration of the sector speci￿c production factor that is relatively
scarce (see any textbook treatment of the speci￿c factors model, for example Bowen, et al. , 1997). In our
model this means that if country 1 is relatively abundant in sector 1 speci￿c capital, trade liberalization
implies a real loss for sector 2 speci￿c capital.
11Table 3 Cobb-Douglas model with capital biased endowments
￿ = 0:2 ￿ = 0:3 ￿ = 0:4 ￿ = 0:5 ￿ = 0:6 ￿ = 0:7
Welfare W = I1=PU1
￿ = 1:0 2.562 2.136 2.116 1.781 1.485 1.032
￿ = 1:2 2.289 1.904 1.979 1.584 1.318 0.912
￿ = 1:4 2.137 1.775 1.896 1.475 1.225 0.846
￿ = 1:6 2.045 1.698 1.844 1.409 1.170 0.806




￿ = 1:0 1.399 1.408 1.417 1.426 1.435 1.445
￿ = 1:2 1.251 1.256 1.261 1.266 1.271 1.277
￿ = 1:4 1.167 1.170 1.174 1.177 1.180 1.184
￿ = 1:6 1.117 1.119 1.122 1.124 1.126 1.128
￿ = 1:8 1.086 1.087 1.089 1.090 1.092 1.093
Bernard, et al. (2007) show in a Heckscher-Ohlin setting with ￿rm heterogeneity that the scarce
factor of production might still gain from trade liberalization, i.e. the Stolper-Samuelson theorem does
not always hold. We will check this in our speci￿c factor model setting, i.e. whether relatively scarce
sector speci￿c capital might also gain from trade liberalization, because of the bene￿cial reallocation
e⁄ect implying a drop in the price index. To address this question, we conduct a simulation of a decline
in trade costs between countries 1 and 2, with country 1 being relatively abundant in sector 1 speci￿c
capital. In particular, we assume that L11 = L21 = 1, K11 = 2, K12 = 1, K21 = 1, K22 = 2. The
Cobb-Douglas parameters for labor and capital are equal to 1=2, i.e. ￿Lim = ￿Kim = 1=2. Table 4 shows




Table 4 E⁄ect of trade liberalization on factor rewards
￿ 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.0
PU1 1.848 1.837 1.816 1.777 1.706 1.582
w1 0.823 0.832 0.842 0.853 0.862 0.866
w1=PU1 0.445 0.453 0.464 0.480 0.505 0.547
r11 0.260 0.266 0.273 0.280 0.286 0.289
r11=PU1 0.141 0.145 0.150 0.157 0.168 0.182
r12 0.304 0.300 0.297 0.293 0.290 0.289
r12=PU1 0.164 0.164 0.163 0.165 0.170 0.182
’
￿
111 1.071 1.089 1.113 1.148 1.199 1.279
’
￿
112 1.035 1.047 1.068 1.103 1.164 1.279
12The results con￿rm our expectations. As in the perfect competition case, lower trade costs lead to
a lower price index, raise the real rewards for mobile labor and the nominal and real rewards of the
abundant sector speci￿c capital.8 The scarce sector speci￿c capital loses in nominal terms, but gains in
real terms, due to the reallocation e⁄ect. The reallocation e⁄ect is illustrated in the last two rows of
Table 4, showing an increasing domestic cuto⁄ productivity as trade costs go down.
Thus when allowing for ￿rm heterogeneity, the political economy implications of the basic speci￿c
factors model result does not necessarily apply. Scarce sector speci￿c capital loses in that model which
might explain why trade reforms are di¢ cult. Contrary, in our model with imperfect competition and
￿rm heterogeneity the scarce sector speci￿c factors can gain from trade liberalization. Still, in both
the declining and expanding sector ￿rm owners with relatively low productivity might lobby against
liberalization, (see Bombardini , 2008, for a discussion of this point). Furthermore it is important to note
that the real income is generally increasing with a higher ￿, i.e. a larger substitution e⁄ect.
Another important result in Bernard, et al. (2007) using a Heckscher-Ohlin setting is that the increase
in domestic cuto⁄ productivity as trade costs are reduced is larger in the comparative advantage sector
and that the exporting cuto⁄ productivity is closer to the domestic cuto⁄ productivity in the compara-
tive advantage industry. The intuition is that pro￿tability from exporting is larger in the comparative
advantage sector. This implies that the exporting cuto⁄ is lower and thus closer to the domestic cut-
o⁄. Moreover, trade liberalization will drive up demand for scarce resources more in the comparative
advantage sector, squeezing more domestic ￿rms out of the market.
Table 5 E⁄ect of trade liberalization on cuto⁄ produc-
tivities in comparative advantage and disadvantage Sec-
tors
￿ 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.0
’
￿
111 1.073 1.091 1.115 1.148 1.199 1.279
’
￿
121 1.843 1.724 1.607 1.494 1.383 1.279
’
￿
112 1.034 1.046 1.067 1.102 1.164 1.279
’
￿
122 2.408 2.145 1.895 1.662 1.453 1.279
In Table 5 we report the results from an exercise examining the change in cuto⁄ levels in comparative
advantage sectors relative to comparative disadvantage sectors. We use the same parameter values as in
the previous exercise. Hence, country 1 has a comparative advantage in sector 1. In line with Bernard,
et al. (2007) we ￿nd that domestic and exporting cuto⁄ levels are closer to each other in the comparative
8The nominal rewards for labor go up in this simulation. In the perfect competition speci￿c factors model the nominal
rewards for labor can either go up or down, depending upon parameter con￿gurations.
13advantage sector. We can see this by comparing the rows for ’￿
121 and ’￿
122, the exporting cuto⁄s in
respectively the comparative advantage and disadvantage sectors of country 1.
The increase in the domestic cuto⁄productivity is smaller in the comparative advantage sector moving
to free trade. At ￿rst sight this seems contrary to the ￿ndings in Bernard, et al. (2007), but the results are
actually in line with what these authors have found. Moving from autarky to costly trade, the domestic
cuto⁄ productivity ￿rst goes down quicker in the comparative advantage sector and later on slower than
in the comparative disadvantage sector. The reason is that the cuto⁄ levels have to converge to the same
values with free trade, because of equal prices and factor costs in the two sectors.
3.3 Factor Mobility with CES Production Function of Input Bundles
In subsection 3.1 we concluded that the speci￿c factors model with Cobb-Douglas production of input
bundles is not the proper model to explore the e⁄ect of factor mobility on the reallocation gains from trade.
Varying the elasticity of transformation between sectors implies that also the Cobb-Douglas parameter
on labor and capital varies, implying that the amount of labor and capital plays a role in the welfare
e⁄ects. Therefore, we now turn to a generalized speci￿c factors model with CES production of input
bundles. The e⁄ect of more factor mobility is studied by varying the elasticity of substitution between
the production factors of input bundles. We work with a clear comparative advantage of country 1 in
sector 1 in a symmetric setup: L1 = L2 = 10, K11 = K22 = 9, K12 = K21 = 1. Table 6 presents
the results of this exercise for the variables welfare de￿ned as total income divided by the price index,
the domestic cuto⁄ productivity in the comparative advantage sector in country 1, ’￿
111, the exporting
productivity in both the comparative advantage and disadvantage sector in country 1, ’￿
121 and ’￿
122 and
the amount of labor used in the comparative advantage sector in country 1, L11.
The last rows in Table 6 indicate that there is less specialization as trade costs and the substitution
elasticity become larger. Higher barriers to trade make it more di¢ cult for countries to specialize ac-
cording to their comparative advantage. A higher substitution elasticity implies that there is less need
to have equal factor proportions. Therefore, countries allocate less labor to their comparative advantage
sector and there is henceforth less specialization.
Less specialization when the substitution elasticity is larger implies that the welfare gains from lower
trade costs are smaller when the substitution elasticity is larger. With less specialization there is less
to gain from lowering trade barriers and hence the welfare gains are smaller. The policy implication is
that countries with less ￿ exibility on their factor markets specialize more and can gain more from trade
liberalization.
14Table 6 Speci￿c factors model with CES produc-
tion function of input bundles
￿ = 1:2 ￿ = 1:6 ￿ = 2 ￿ = 2:4 ￿ = 2:8
Welfare W = I1=PU1
￿ = 1:0 4.374 4.374 4.374 4.374 4.374
￿ = 1:4 3.796 3.796 3.797 3.797 3.798
￿ = 1:8 3.522 3.525 3.529 3.533 3.537
￿ = 2:2 3.371 3.380 3.390 3.399 3.409
￿ = 2:6 3.282 3.297 3.312 3.328 3.343
Cuto⁄ CA domestic (’
￿
111)
￿ = 1:0 0.473 0.473 0.473 0.473 0.473
￿ = 1:4 0.443 0.442 0.442 0.442 0.442
￿ = 1:8 0.426 0.425 0.424 0.423 0.422
￿ = 2:2 0.415 0.413 0.412 0.411 0.409
￿ = 2:6 0.407 0.405 0.404 0.402 0.401
Cuto⁄ CA export (’
￿
121)
￿ = 1:0 0.473 0.473 0.473 0.473 0.473
￿ = 1:4 0.515 0.516 0.516 0.517 0.517
￿ = 1:8 0.558 0.561 0.564 0.567 0.570
￿ = 2:2 0.603 0.611 0.619 0.628 0.637
￿ = 2:6 0.653 0.667 0.682 0.698 0.714
Cuto⁄ CD export (’
￿
122)
￿ = 1:0 0.473 0.473 0.473 0.473 0.473
￿ = 1:4 0.680 0.680 0.679 0.678 0.677
￿ = 1:8 0.967 0.961 0.954 0.947 0.939
￿ = 2:2 1.290 1.271 1.250 1.229 1.207
￿ = 2:6 1.630 1.590 1.548 1.506 1.468
Labor CA country 1 (L11)
￿ = 1:0 9.000 9.000 9.000 9.000 9.000
￿ = 1:4 8.841 8.782 8.720 8.655 8.588
￿ = 1:8 8.559 8.374 8.171 7.951 7.720
￿ = 2:2 8.283 7.962 7.612 7.249 6.892
￿ = 2:6 8.046 7.614 7.161 6.722 6.316
CA comparative advantage sector; CD comparative disadvantage sector
15The changes in cuto⁄ levels in relation to trade costs are as expected: lower trade costs reduce
the exporting cuto⁄ productivities and raise the domestic cuto⁄ productivities. The e⁄ect of changes
in the substitution elasticity on the cuto⁄ productivities are somewhat di¢ cult to interpret and can
be explained with the changes in the degree of specialization. We observed before that there is less
specialization when the substitution elasticity increases. Therefore, country 1 faces more competition
on the export market from domestic ￿rms in its comparative advantage sector 1. This implies that the
exporting cuto⁄productivity in its comparative advantage sector, ’￿
121, goes up with a larger substitution
elasticity. The domestic cuto⁄ productivity instead goes down: it is easier to survive domestically, as
there is less entry to make pro￿ts on the exporting market. In the comparative disadvantage sector
instead, exporting becomes easier, as there is less competition from domestic ￿rms in the export market.
Therefore the cuto⁄ productivity, ’￿
122, goes down with a higher substitution elasticity.
4 Concluding Remarks
We introduced ￿rm heterogeneity in the traditional speci￿c factors model to study the e⁄ect of factor
mobility. We showed that the welfare gains from trade liberalization are smaller with a higher substitution
elasticity between the mobile and ￿xed factor, as this leads to less specialization and less scope for gains
from lower trade costs. We also found that the scarce sector speci￿c factor might gain from freer trade
when ￿rms are heterogeneous because of productivity gains due to ￿rm selection within the sector. Finally,
it is shown that the selection e⁄ect is stronger in the comparative advantage sector. A possible extension
of the current research with policy implications could be to model one of the production factors as partly
mobile and partly immobile and to study the e⁄ect of a larger mobile share on the factor rewards of the
￿ immobile￿factor.
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18Appendix A Concise Equilibrium







and the ZCP, the FE in equation (16)



















A = ￿fe (A.1)
We impose ￿im > ￿m ￿ 1 to guarantee that expected revenues are ￿nite. The implication of assuming a









Under a Pareto distribution, the FE, equation (16) becomes:
2 X
k=1
(1 ￿ Fim (’￿
ikm))
￿m ￿ 1
￿im ￿ (￿m ￿ 1)
fikmpZim = ￿fepZim (A.3)

















Next, we use the Pareto distribution and the FE to write the mass of ￿rms as a function of the cuto⁄
productivity. Total revenues in country i in sector m should be equal to the total value of input bundles:
2 X
k=1
Nikmrikm (e ’ikm) = pZimZim (A.5)
Also, the relative mass of ￿rms is a function of the shares of the densities of productivities that can
produce pro￿tably in the market:
Nikm =
















(1 ￿ Fim (’￿
ikm))rikm (e ’ikm) = pZimZim (A.7)











(1 ￿ Fim (’￿
ikm))￿fikm
(A.8)
As a next step, substituting equation (A.3) into equation (A.8), we can write the number of ￿rms Nijm
as a function of the cuto⁄ level ’￿










Next, we rewrite the expression for demand, equation (12), as follows. First, substitute equation (A.9)


























































































































































. To derive supply, equation (19), as a ￿rst step we substitute






































































































The baseline parameter values are set in accordance with the parameters in the numerical analysis of
Bernard, et al. (2007). The baseline parameters can be found in Table 7.
Without loss of generality the substitition elasticity between sectors, ￿, is set at 2 and the shift
parameters of both sectors ￿m are equal to each other, equal to 1=2. For the elasticity of substitution
within sectors, ￿m, we work with a value of 3:8 and for the Pareto shape parameter ￿m and size parameter
￿m with values of 3:4 and 0:2, respectively, following estimates using plant-level US manufacturing data
in Bernard, et al. (2003). The parameter value of the sunk entry cost fe scales the mass of ￿rms and
without loss of generality fe is set at 1. Fixed production costs, domestically and in the foreign market,
f and fx respectively, are 10% of the sunk entry cost, 0:1. The domestic and exporting ￿xed costs are
equal in the baseline, implying equal domestic and exporting cuto⁄productivity when iceberg trade costs
are 1. The death probability ￿ rescales the mass of entrants relative to the mass of producing ￿rms and
without loss of generality, a value of 0:025 is chosen. In the Heckscher-Ohlin model we assume that the
shift parameters of the two sectors ￿Lim and ￿Kim are equal to 1=2. The substitution elasticity between
labor and capital is subject to variation to mimic variation in factor mobility across sectors. In the
speci￿c factors model the substitution elasticity is equal to 1 and the Cobb-Douglas (shift) parameters
21are subject to variation. The choice of the size of the labor force and the amount of capital is arbitrary
and motivated in the main text.
Table 7 Baseline simulation: Parameters and results for endogenous variables
Substitution elasticity sectors ￿ 2
Shift parameter sector m ￿m 0.5
Substitution elasticity sectors ￿m 3.8
Pareto shape parameter ￿m 3.4
Pareto shift parameter ￿m 0.2
Sunk entry costs fe 1
Fixed costs f 0.1
Fixed export costs fx 0.1
Death probability ￿ 0.025
Shift parameter capital and labor ￿m 0.5
22